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WHY SO FAST, WHY SO SLOW?:

EXPLAINING CASE PROCESSING
TIME*
MARY LEE LUSKIN**
ROBERT C. LUSKIN***
From the time of Shakespeare and before, there have been
complaints about "the law's delay," and it is a common perception
that cases generally take too long to wind their way through American courts.' Normatively, this is a matter of "delay" versus "haste,"
but the factual question is simply of time: How long does a given
case take? The answer is the variable increasingly known as case
processing time. The cases involved may be civil or criminal, and if
criminal they may be felony or misdemeanor, but here we restrict
the discussion to felony cases.
Why should we care about felony case processing time? At the
individual level, the consequences are mostly for the defendant.
Longer processing times are costlier in jail time and psychological
wear-and-tear, but tend to lower the probability of conviction. Both
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National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of LEAA. Portions of this
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earlier stages, and Richard Fritz, Anthony Ragona, Doug Smith, John McIver, David
Kessler, andjo Dixon for their able assistance. Cathy Widom and Richard Lempert have
kindly read the paper and contributed helpful comments. The analysis and conclusions
are our own and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Department
ofJustice, the American Judicature Society, or any of the individuals aforementioned.
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*** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Alabama. Ph.D. (Political
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defense and prosecution need at least a certain minimum time to
prepare, but the prosecution's case tends to decay as witnesses forget, lose interest, move away, or die. At the aggregate level, the
distribution of felony processing times affects us all. Cutting
processing times too short may sacrifice justice. But beyond some
justice-providing threshold, the societal implications of lengthier
cases are mostly adverse. Lower probabilities of conviction undermine the incapacitative and deterrent value of criminal sanctions
and thus carry a cost in public safety. More directly, lengthier cases
consume more jail space and police hours-jail space that could be
devoted to convicted criminals and police hours that could be spent
on patrol. Consequently, many communities have sought to reduce
processing times.
Such efforts naturally raise the problem of explanation. We
cannot tell what reforms are likely to succeed or to be worthwhile
unless we know what variables affect processing times, under what
conditions, and by how much. Despite previous investigation, our
understanding of why processing times are as long or as short as
they are remains tenuous and partial. 2 Many relevant studies are
monocausal and lack adequate controls. The studies of Church et
al. 3 and Flanders, 4 the major sources of what Church proclaims to
be the "new conventional wisdom," are essentially bivariate (as
Church acknowledges). 5 The same is true of the studies of Grossman et al., 6 Boyum, 7 and Nimmer.8 The studies of Neubauer and

Ryan 9 and Hausner and Seidel' ° are multivariate, but have other
shortcomings. Neubauer and Ryan surrender the final selection of
variables to the atheoretical whims of stepwise regression.1 1
Hausner and Seidel neglect some obvious case-level variables, in2 For an earlier review of the literature stressing the need for a more theoretical

approach and better analysis, see Luskin, Building a Theory of Case ProcessingTime, 62 JUDICATURE 114 (1978).
3 T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS, (1978).
4 S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN U.S. FEDERAL DisTRICT COURTS (1977).

5 Church, supra note 1.

Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, supra note 1.
7 Boyum, A Perspective on Civil Delay in Trial Courts, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 170 (1979).
8 R. NIMMER, THE NATUrE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS (1978).
9 Neubauer & Ryan, Criminal Courts and the Delivery of SpeedyJustice: The Influence of Case
and Defendant Characteristics,7 JUST. SYs. J. 213-35 (1982).
6

10

J.

HAUSNER & M. SEIDEL, AN ANALYSIS OF CASE PROCESSING TIME IN THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA SUPERIOR COURT

(1979).

11 See Lewis-Beck, Stepwise Regression: A Caution, 5 POL. METHODOLOGY 213-40 (1978).
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cluding pretrial motions and defendant absence. And neither really
addresses the effects of court structures and arrangements.
This article presents an attempt at a fuller and more satisfactory
explanation. We begin by developing a more theory-informed and
fully-specified model. En route, we propose explicit criteria for explanatory variables and confront the question of mathematical form,
making the model nonlinear and nonadditive as appropriate. We
then estimate the model on a two-year sample of cases from Detroit's Recorder's Court. The data (and model) are thus confined to
variables that vary in this one setting over this one time period, but
the setting and period afford hard-to-come-by glimpses of structural
variations and their effects.
I.

SETTING AND DATA

Recorder's Court is the municipal criminal court of Detroit. At
the time of the study, it had both preliminary and trial jurisdiction,
was staffed by an elective bench of 20 judges, augmented by a varying number of visiting judges, and received approximately 11,000
felony cases a year. Our analysis is based on a random sample of
felony complaints filed between April, 1976, and March, 1978, stratified by month of filing. With cases that saw no arrest and thus
never properly began set aside the sample totaled 2026. All but
twenty-six (one percent) of the cases reached disposition by the
study's close. For the remaining 2000, the mean processing time
was seventy-six days, with a standard deviation of ninety-four. Broken down by month of origin, the mean varied from fifty-two days
for cases beginning inJuly, 1977, to 147 days for cases beginning in
May, 1976. To supplement and illuminate these quantitative data,
we also conducted scattered interviews with court participants.
We chose this court and time for a reason. Recorder's Court at
this time was the site of a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration sponsored delay reduction project that altered the calendaring
system, temporarily increased judicial manpower, and made other
changes in court operations. 12 Moreover, these reforms were staggered, permitting an empirical separation of effects (no perfect or
prohibitive collinearity). Hence the data present an unusually good
opportunity to examine structural as well as case-specific effects.
II.

A.

MATTER OF DEFINITION

How long a case takes is partly a matter of definition-at what
12 Described further in D. NEUBAUER, M. LIPETZ, M. LUSKIN &J. RYAN, MANAGING THE
PACE OFJUSTICE: AN EVALUATION OF LEAA's COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM (1981).
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point does it "begin," at what point does it "end?" For this article,
processing time is the number of days between arraignment on the
arrest warrant (the defendant's initial appearance in court) and disposition by dismissal, trial verdict, or plea. For comparability's sake,
we exclude sentencing; all cases must end in dismissal, trial verdict,
or plea, but only convictions need sentencing. With that exception,
however, we take an inclusive view. Processing time is the whole
time in court.
There is no point in separating upper and lower court time, as
recommended by Neubauer,13 because Recorder's Court combined
upper and lower court functions-cases stayed there from beginning to end. Also at variance with Neubauer, we do not subtract
"skip time"-intervals during which the case awaits a defendant who
has failed to appear.1 4 Skip time, as Neubauer remarks, is largely
beyond the court's control. 15 But it is still part of processing time.
We shall do better to treat it as an explanatory variable. If, but only
if, its coefficient equals 1.0, then the two approaches are equivalent.
The same applies to "psych time"-intervals of psychiatric evaluation or treatment-and other hiatuses.
III.

WHAT AFFECTS PROCESSING TIME?

At a general level, we posit, processing time depends on six factors: three case-level, three court-level.
A.

CASE-SPECIFIC INCENTIVES

Defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and other
court participants are semi-independent decision makers with institutionally defined options and reinforcement contingencies. They
respond to economic, social, intellectual, and professional incentives to do some things and not others.' 6 Different variables present
13 Neubauer, Improving the Analysis and Presentationof Data on Case Processing Time, 74 J.

CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1589 (1982); J. HAUSNER & M. SEIDEL, supra note 10.
14 See Neubauer, supra note 13; Neubauer & Ryan, supra note 9.
15 Neubauer, supra note 13.
16 J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE:

AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF

CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); R. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF FELONY BAIL PROCESSES (1982); M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING:
THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); L. MATHER,
PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL?: THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL-CASE DISPOSITION (1979); P.
NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINALJUS-

(1979); Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as a Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptation
of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15 (1967); Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing
and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 393 (1979); Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence: Evaluatingan Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 287 (1983).
TICE
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different mixes of incentives for different participants, but at the
case-level, the relevant variables include:
Attorney Type. Because retained attorneys are paid directly by
clients, who generally need time to scrape money together and who
may be less eager to pay once the case is resolved, these attorneys
may handle cases more slowly than public defenders or court-ap17
pointed counsel.
PretrialRelease. Whether the defendant awaits the outcome in
jail affects both his motivation and the motivations of others. A
jailed defendant has more incentive to move his case quickly. Less
obviously, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys may feel pressure in the same direction. To the extent that the state imposes
shorter time limits for cases involving jailed defendants, 18 judges
believe that presumptively innocent defendants should be detained
as short a time as possible, or jail space is a scarce commodity, 19 the
court will give priority to jailed defendants. Indeed, the cost of
housing the overflow population from the overcrowded Wayne
County Jail was the immediate impetus for the delay reduction project, and "what kept our feet to the fire," in the words of a delay
reduction project manager.20 Interviews revealed that the "jail
problem" loomed large in participants' minds.
Seriousness. Defendants charged with more serious crimes risk a
greater penalty and should thus find "strategic delay" more attractive. Prosecutors, too, take serious cases more seriously, both to
satisfy their own sense of justice and to forestall police or public
complaint. For the same reasons, judges allow fuller exercise of the
adversary process in more serious cases. 2 1 To gauge seriousness,
we used the maximum term of incarceration (in months) on the
original charge. 2 2 For cases involving more than one charge, we
17 See Blumberg, supra note 16; R. NIMMER, supra note 8; NARDULLI, supra note 16.
18 p. NARDULLI, supra note 16; W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA, (1976).
19 R. FLEMMING, supra note 16.
20 Id.; M. NEUBAUER, M. LIPETZ, M. LUSKIN &J. RYAN, supra note 12.
21 See M. HEUMANN, supra note 16; L. MATHER, supra note 16; Forst & Brosi, A Theoreti-

cal and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6J. OF LEGAL STUD. 177 (1977).
22 One alternative would be a Sellin & Wolfgang or Sellin & Wolfgang-like measure
based on the amount and kind of harm and defendant-victim relationship. See T. SELLIN

& M.

WOLFGANG, MEASURING DELINQUENCY

(1964). See also J.

JACOBY,

L.

MELLON,

RATLEDGE & S. TURNER, PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING: A NATIONAL STUDY

E.

(1982);

Bernstein, Kick, Leung & Schultz, Charge Reduction: An Intermediary State in the Process of
Labelling Criminal Defendants, 56 Soc. FORCES 362 (1977); Forst & Brosi, supra note 21.
Another measure could be based on penalties actually imposed as in McDavid & Stipak,
Simultaneous Scaling of Offense Seriousness and Sentence Severity Through Canonical Correlation
Analysis, 16 LAW AND SoC'Y REV. 147 (1981). We prefer the statutory maximum penalty
for several reasons. First, it has the practical advantage of being readily obtainable from

court records. Second, it is, in effect, the legal ordering of seriousness, and as such may
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counted the highest maximum, and we arbitrarily quantified "life"
as 480 months.
PriorRecord. Like seriousness, prior record affects the stakes. A
defendant with more numerous prior convictions will probably receive a stiffer sentence if convicted and should thus be more inclined to bear pretrial incarceration, financial hardship, or extended
uncertainty in return for a higher probability of acquittal, dismissal,
or favorable plea bargain.
RegularJudge. Visiting judges bear relatively slender responsibility for court operations and outcomes. In Recorder's Court, visitors did not really have their own dockets, even under the
"individual docket" (see below), and thus escaped the individual
docket's incentives to keep caseloads down.
B.

CASE COMPLEXITY

In ways admittedly difficult to measure, some cases are simply
more complex and almost inherently more time-absorbing than
others. One measureable dimension is:
Number of Defendants. Multiple defendants exacerbate problems
23
of scheduling and coordination and complicate plea bargaining.
C.

CASE EVENTS

As a case unfolds, the participants take some actions and not
others, and what they do may curtail or prolong processing time,
either by design or as a side-effect. Such case events include:
Early Dismissal. An early dismissal (at or before the preliminary
hearing) plainly abbreviates processing time. Again, Recorder's
Court had preliminary as well as trial jurisdiction.
Trial. Trials, in contrast, are intrinsically the most time-consuming disposition. Counterintuitively, some cross-court comparisons show courts with proportionally more trials processing cases
no more slowly, 24 but case-level analyses of more fully-specified
carry normative weight for court personnel. See McCleary, O'Neal, Epperlein, Jones &
Gray, Effects of Legal Educationand Work Experience on Perceptionsof Crime Seriousness, 28 Soc.
PROBS. 276 (1981). Third, it probably reflects the central tendency of societal perceptions of seriousness as Rossi, Waite, Bose and Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative

Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 227 (1974) suggests. Finally, and
perhaps most important, it is a direct measure of the defendant's stakes.
23 The number of witnesses should have a similarly tangling effect on scheduling, but
is unfortunately not in the data.
24 See T.CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, supra note 4; S. FLANDERS, supra note
5; R. GILLESPIE, JUDICIAL PRODUCTIVITY AND COURT DELAY: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDerAL DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Gillespie, The Production of Court Services: An
Analysis of Scale Effects and Other Factors, 5J. OF LEGAL STUD. 243 (1976).
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models show the expected effect. 25 Pleas and later dismissals fall
between trials and early dismissals, and form the "omitted category" in an implicit dummyization of disposition type. We do not
distinguish post-preliminary-exam dismissals from pleas, despite the
former's correlation with processing time, because dismissals at this
stage are either spurious correlate or consequence, not cause. The
spuriousness arises when prosecutors have only feeble evidence yet
face public or police demand for action, and so prolong the case
until the heat is off, then seek a dismissal to avoid wasting resources.
The consequentiality is more straightforward. Older cases have
often deteriorated and are thus more often dismissed.
PretrialMotions. Hearing and preparing motions-for discovery,
to supress evidence, and so forth-take time both in and out of
court. 26 Empirically, it is the fact rather than the number of motions
that seems to matter.
Psychiatric Hiatus. Psychiatric evaluation for competency to
stand trial and treatment of those found incompetent take time, but
the delay is not tautologically equal to the time spent on evaluation
or treatment. The court may either make up for lost time when the
defendant returns or incur incidental, second-order delays.
Defendant Absence. Defendants sometimes fail to appear for
scheduled hearings, and an AWOL defendant brings the case to a
standstill. As with psychiatric hiatus, though, the translation from
waiting time to processing time need not be one-to-one.
Late or Second preliminary hearing. Preliminary hearings originally
waived may later be asked for and held, and preliminary hearings
later ruled insufficient may be reheld. Either involves a retracing of
steps.
Mistrial. Repetitions of later events have similar effects, most
notably when a trial ends in a mistrial and the case is retried.
Continuances. Some continuances result from defendant absence, motions, or psychiatric hiatus and are covered separately in
those variables. But other continuances also add to processing
time.
D.

STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES AND STRUCTURAL FACILITATION

At the court level, structural and administrative arrangements
provide more general incentives. They affect participants' interest
in speeding up or slowing down all or broad classes of cases. More
intrinsically, they may accelerate or retard the movement of cases,
25 See J. HAUSNER & M. SEIDEL, supra note 10; Neubauer & Ryan, supra note 9.
26 See Neubauer & Ryan, supra note 9.
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motivational effects quite aside: they may be more or less efficient.
Since most court-level variables involve mixtures of incentives and
facilitation, we list the variables under these headings together.
Docket Type. Recorder's Court changed during the study period
from a central to an individual docket (from a master to an individual calendar).27 Having previously been responsible for only an illdefined share of the work, each judge now had to answer for a specific set of cases. The delay reduction project staff reinforced the
effect by publishing bi-monthly reports listing and ranking
caseloads. To avoid appearing in a bad light, judges had to move
cases rapidly enough to keep their dockets down. Thus, accountability honed incentives. Even Church et al., 28 who are skeptical of
docket effects in criminal courts, report "competition among the
judges in virtually every individual calendar court visited." 29 On the
other hand, critics of the individual docket argue that the central
docket is more rational and efficient.3 0 The argument, in essence, is
that docket type is facilitative rather than incentive-related, and that
its impact is not negative but positive. We believe that the effect is
3
negative, but the data will tell. '
Case-Track. Another innovation was a "case-track" designed to
bring all cases to disposition within ninety days. The case-track required that each of several case events- preliminary hearing, plea
negotiations, pretrial motions, and trial-take place by a specified
deadline. In part, the track was facilitative. Delay reduction project
staff prepared forms showing scheduling dates that would meet a
ninety-day track and held case scheduling workshops for judges and
their clerks. But the track also added incentives. Although judges
could not be forced to adhere to the deadlines, the delay reduction
project staff, Special Judicial Administrator (see below), and Chief
27 Recorder's Court has shifted back and forth between central and individual calendars. In late 1975, it changed the docket from individual to central; in late 1976 (during
our study) it changed it back. See D. NEUBAUER, M. LIPETZ, M. LusIN &J. RYAN, supra
note 12, for an account of these changes andJ. EISENSTmIN AND H. JACOB, supra note 16,
on prior oscillations.
28 T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, supra note 3.
29 Id. at 73.
30 See M. SOLOMON, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT (1973).
31 T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, supra note 3, find little effect, but exclude two master calendar courts with particularly high median processing times. With
these courts retained, the master calendar courts average twenty-five percent longer median processing times than the individual calendar courts. R. NIMMER, supra note 8,
reviews and criticizes a number of other studies showing little effect. None controls for
more than a handful of variables. Nimmer's own study includes more adequate controls
and still shows little effect but is based on cases involving only three offenses, which may
or may not be typical.
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Judge made considerable efforts to persuade or shame them into
compliance. In addition, the plea cut-off date, after which no further concessions were to be offered, undermined the defendant's
incentives to foot-drag.
Decentralized Plea Bargaining. The delay reduction project also
transferred plea bargaining from the central prosecutor's office to
individual "docket prosecutors," one for each of five groups of
same-floor courtrooms. The rationale was mostly facilitative. Proximity would breed familiarity, which would increase efficiency. But
the effect may also have been due to incentives. Centralized pleabargaining was the province of specialists. Processing time and
backlog were not their concern. Decentralization, however, made
docket prosecutors responsible for the dockets within their domain,
and thus gave them reason to keep "their" processing times and
dockets within bounds. Finally, decentralization was accompanied
by a small increase in the number of prosecutors and may have decreased processing times by that route as well.
The Crash Program. A final element of the delay reduction project was a "crash program" that did several things simultaneously.
Under the direction of a SpecialJudicial Administrator appointed by
the Michigan Supreme Court, the court added visiting judges, began monitoring judges' bench time, instituted meetings among
prosecutors, judges, project staff, police, and sheriffs, and reopened
negotiations on stalled older cases. The visiting judges decreased
the per-judge caseload; the monitoring of courtrooms rewarded
hard-workers and penalized shirkers; the reopened plea negotiations upped defendants' incentives to plead; and the efforts at increased coordination may have been a facilitating factor. The
Special Judicial Administrator cracked the whip throughout.
Although the crash program officially ran for only six months, its
central elements-reopened plea negotiations, monitoring, increased manpower, and the Special Judicial Administrator- remained even after its official demise. Operationally, therefore, we
32
consider it as continuing through the remainder of the study.
E.

CASELOAD

To the extent that a variable number of cases compete for a
relatively fixed quantity of court attention, more cases should mean
32 We experimented with a separate dummy variable to distinguish cases initiated
after the "official" crash period. The coefficients for the "crash" and "post-crash" variables were both statistically and substantively indistinguishable.
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longer processing times.3 3 Yet caseload is also a criterion of court
performance, and concommitantly a source of pressure. Excessive
caseloads may bring embarrassment or electoral displeasure, 3 4 so
that judges and prosecutors may process cases more expeditiously
as caseloads rise. Either way, processing time depends on caseload.
The only question is one of sign.
Court Caseload. Under the central docket, the relevant caseload
is the number of cases per judge. The effect may be either positive
(cases overwhelming resources) or negative (compensatively faster
processing as caseload rises).
Individual Caseload. Under the individual docket, the relevant
caseload is that of the judge handling the case, and the effect should
be negative. Individual accountability makes caseload a highly visible criterion of performance. Judges who improved their position in
the monthly rankings pointed proudly to their achievement-even
judges who claimed not to care about caseload. Judges who lost
ground avoided the subject. Operationally, we defined both
35
caseloads as of the beginning of each month.
Constraints of measurement aside, we have selected these variables as a function solely of their ability to serve in the minor premise of an implicit syllogism: variable x reflects one or more of our
six generic determinants; therefore variable x affects processing
time. We claim three advantages for this self-conscious approach.
First, it points us in the direction of comprehensiveness. Within the
limits of observation, we have tried to include everything that has to
do with caseload, case complexity, case-level or structural incentives, case events, or structural facilitation. Second, and at the same
time, the list is selective. The major premise indicates not only what
to include but what to ignore. We exclude such common variables
as the defendant's age, sex and race, which may affect processing
time, but only in anterior fashion through the probability of trial and
other case events. Finally, the simple deductions involved provide
33 Aggregate results, however, are not particularly supportive. See T.CHURCH, A.
CARLSON,J. LEE & T. TAN, supra note 3, R. NIMMER, supra note 8; Gillespie, supra note 24.
34 SeeJ. EISENSTEIN & H.JACOB, supra note 16; P. NARDULLI, supra note 16; Heumann,
Thinking About Plea Bargaining,in THE STUDY OF CRIMINAL COURTS: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 210 (P. Nardulli ed. 1979); Nardulli, OrganizationalAnalysis of Criminal Courts: An
Overview and Some Speculation, in THE STUDY OF CRIMINAL COURTS: POLICrrAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (P. Nardulli ed. 1979).
35 Current caseload is affected by mean processing time, but the effect is lagged, and

only in the mean: the processing times of contemporaneous cases have no effect, and
that of any single case in the past practically none. Consequently, we need not specify
and estimate a caseload equation alongside the processing time equation.
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clear reasons to believe that these variables, and not others have an
effect.
IV.

WHAT KINDS OF EFFECTS?

Moving from words to equations requires considering the
shapes of these variables' effects (roughly, slopes). An explanatory
variable x's effect on a dependent variable y is the expected change
in y, for each unit change in x, ceteris paribus. For example, the court
caseload's effect on case processing time is the number of additional
days a case can be expected to take for each additional case per
judge.
For the most part, we presume constant effects. Yet several effects should be nonconstant. Prior record's effect is probably nonlinear (a function of its own value). An additional conviction should
make little difference to the likely sentence, and thus to the incentive
to procrastinate, if it is merely the latest in a long string. The greatest difference should be between zero and one, the next greatest
between one and two, and so on. To capture this pattern, we write
36
processing time as a linear function of logged prior convictions.
Other nonconstancies are nonadditivities (effects that are functions
of the values of other explanatory variables). Since a judge has
more control over trials than other dispositions, the individual
docket should shorten trial cases more than others. Since the casetrack introduced new deadlines for motions and trials, it should
have achieved greater reductions for cases with motions or trials. As
we have suggested, the relevant caseload depends on the docket system: the court's caseload under the central docket and the judge's
own caseload under the individual docket. Moreover, since visiting
judges do not have their own dockets, the judge's caseload should
matter only for regularjudges. And, finally, since cases are not officially part of the caseload until after the preliminary hearing, neither
caseload variable should have an effect for early dismissals. We accommodate these interactions by adding multiplicative terms.
Abbreviating the variable names, the processing time equation
is thus: CPT = 0 + 131 TRIAL + 132 DPE + 13 MOTION + 114
PSYCH + 135 ABS + 136 LPE + 137 MISTR + 18 CONTIN + 10 £
DEF + 131o RETAIN + 131,BAIL + 112 SERIOUS + 013 ln(PRIOR)
+ 1314 DOCK + 1315 TRACK + 1316 LOCPLEA + 117 CRASH + 018
DOCK*TRIAL + 1319 TRACK*TRIAL + 32o TRACK*MOTION +
+
122 JLOAD*DOCK*(11321 AVLOAD* (1-DOCK)* (1-DPE)
36 Since In 0 is undefined, we add .01 to the count of prior convictions, taking In
(PRIOR + .01).
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DPE)*REGJ + u, where the 13's are unknown parameters and u is an
unmeasured disturbance. Table 1 provides a key to the abbreviations and a reminder of operational definitions.
TABLE 1
VARIABLES IN THE MODEL
Standard
Variable
Case
processing
time

Abbreviation
CPT

Number of
#DEF
Defendants
Dismissal at or DPE
before the
preliminary
hearing

Trial

TRIAL

Pretrial
motions

MOTION

Operationalized as

Min.

Max.

Mean

Deviation

Days between
arrival
(arraignment on
warrant) and
disposition

1

744

76.28

94.13

Number of
defendants
1 Case is
dismissed at or
before
preliminary
hearing
0 Otherwise
1 Case disposed
by trial
0 Otherwise
1 Formal Pretrial

1

8

1.21

0.56

0

1

0.19

0.39

0

1

0.11

0.31

0

1

0.15

0.36

0 No pretrial
motions
Psychiatric
hiatus

PSYCH

Days lost to
psychiatric
evaluation or
treatment

0

98

0.87

7.85

Defendant's
absence

ABS

Days lost due to
defendant's
failure to
appear
Number of
continuances

0

605

5.82

37.09

0

8

0.14

0.54

Late or second LPE
preliminary
hearing

1 Case sent back
for preliminary
hearing
0 Other

0

2

0.02

0.16

Mistrial

MSTR

0

1

0.002

0.05

Type of
defense
attorney

RETAIN

I Mistrial
declared
0 Otherwise
I Retained
counsel
0 Otherwise

0

1

0.18

0.39

Number of
CONTIN
continuances
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table continued
Standard
AbbreVariable
viation
Pretrial release BAIL

Min.
0

Max.
1

Seriousness of SERIOUS Statutory
maximum of
charge
count with
highest
maximum in
months

0

480

150.47

151.97

Defendant's
PRIOR
prior record

Number of prior
convictions

0

62

2.02

3.87

Regular vs.
visiting
judge

1 Case heard by
regular judge

0

1

0.77

0.42

REGJ

Operationalized as
1 Defendant free
prior to
disposition
0 Otherwise

Mean
0.66

Deviation
0.47

0 Visitor
Docket type

DOCK

1 Case initiated
under individual
docket
0 Under central
docket

0

1

0.73

0.44

Case-track

TRACK

1 Case initiated
after case-track
in place
0 Before casetrack

0

1

0.53

0.50

Decentralized
plea
bargaining

LOCPLEA 1 Case initiated
after plea
bargaining
decentralized
0 Before
decentralized
plea bargaining

0

1

0.18

0.39

0.24

0.43

75.215

93.186

Crash program CRASH
and
aftermath

1 Case initiated in
crash or postcrash periods
0 Otherwise

0

1

JLOAD

Number of
defendants on
disposition
judge's
individual
docket in month
in which case
was initiated

0

399

Judge's
caseload
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table continued
Standard
Variable
Average
caseload

Abbreviation
AVLOAD

Operationalized as Min.
Max.
Mean
Number of
103.10 423.42 224.95
defendants
before court at
beginning of
month in which
case was
initiated,
divided by the
number of
judges available

Deviation
39.07

V. ESTIMATION
At this point, we must address some methodological issues. Attentive readers may have noticed that these data form an unaggregated time-series, with cases implicitly indexed by date of initiation.
Averaging within months (for example) would reduce our case-level
observations to a monthly time-series. But we should gain nothing
and lose much in the process. Case-level analysis yields estimates of
structural as well as case-level information effects, but aggregation
by time-point wastes case-level information and thus cuts efficiency.
37
Aggregation inflates the R2 but makes the estimates less precise.
These remarks specifically apply to interrupted time-series analysis,
which not only wastes information but solves a problem (autocorrelation of u) that does not exist before aggregation.
Another thing better left undone is separate pre- and post-innovations estimations, as in Neubauer and Ryan.38 Apart from anything else, the structural changes are not nearly coincident enough
for clearcut before-after comparison. Even if they were, separate estimations would effectively respecify the model in theoretically
unappealing ways, lumping all of the structural variables together,
submerging their combined main effect in differences of intercepts,
and indiscriminately conditioning all the nonstructural effects on
the combined before-after structurai variable.
Contrary to Neubauer,3 9 we use the full sample. Neubauer's
recommendation that modelers discard long cases as "atypical" and
"outliers" is wrong on several counts. Long cases are not necessarily outliers. (And short ones may be.) Extreme residuals, not ex37 Eg.,J. KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 322-28 (1971).
38 Neubauer & Ryan, supra note 9.
39 Neubauer, supra note 13.
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treme values on the dependent variable, define outliers. Further,
even true outliers are not generally discarded, but are used as a
stimulus and guide to respecification. 40 As for typicality, extremely
long-and extremely short-cases may be atypical, but why settle
for explaining only typical cases? Atypical processing times are the
product of atypical values of relevant explanatory variables, and any
model worth its salt should be asked and given the chance to explain
41
them.
A more legitimate worry is heteroscedasticity. The precipitous
decline in processing times over the period of study raises the possibility of a similar decline in their variance, and, more to the point, in
the variance of u. Dividing the observations by month of origin and
subjecting the hypothesis of equal variances to the usual likelihood
ratio test 4 2 produces a X2 of 2006.8, with twenty-three degrees of

freedom. As a result, we have turned to generalized least squares
(GLS) as opposed to ordinary least squares (OLS). In effect, this
form of GLS weights each observation by the reciprocal of the samresiduals for its month. 4 3 The
ple standard deviation of the (OLS)
44
results are displayed in Table 2.
VI.

RESULTS

The results generally conform to expectation. Most of the parameter estimates have the signs explicitly or implicitly predicted
significance. At .47,
above, and most attain conventional levels of
45
the R 2 is rewarding by micro-data standards.
Table 2 supplies estimates of most, but not all, of the effects.
The constant effects are simply the corresponding parameters, but
40 Bollen & Jackman, Regression Diagnostics: An Expository Treatment of Outliers and Influential Cases, 13 Soc. METHODS RES. 510 (1985).
41 Neubauer, supra note 13, also deletes cases involving psychiatric hiatus, simply because they take longer. Again, it is better to use psychiatric hiatus as an explanatory
variable and give the model a chance to explain.
42 A. MOOD, F. GRAYBILL & D. BOES, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF STATISTICS
439-40 (1974).
43 T. FOMBY, R. HILL & S. JOHNSON, ADVANCED ECONOMETRIC METHODS 174-76
(1984).
44 We should perhaps mention again that the perennial bugbear collinearity is not a
problem here. Only extreme collinearity does much damage, and the only damage it
can do is to produce large standard errors, which in turn mean wide confidence intervals
and substantively significant but statistically insignificant estimates. Here, a few substantively large parameter estimates (for mistrials, late or second preliminary exams and the
docket x trial interaction) are statistically insignificant. But the cause is low variance, not
collinearity. See infra note 48.
45 The R2 here is the squared Pearsonian correlation between the actual and GLS2
predicted processing time. See Luskin, Looking for R ."MeasuringExplanation Outside OLS,
10 POL. METHODOLOGY 513 (1984)..
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TABLE 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATES

RLs = .470
Variable

Coefficient

#DEF
TRIAL
DPE
MOTION
PSYCH
ABS
CONTIN
LPE
MISTR
RETAIN
BAIL
SERIOUS
In (PRIOR)
DOCK
TRACK
LOCPLEA
CRASH
DOCK*TRAIL
TRACK*TRIAL
TRACK*MOTION
AVLOAD*(1-DOCK)*(1-DPE)
JLOAD*DOCK*REGJ*(1-DPE)
CONSTANT

6.77**
68.99**
-31.04**
53.70**
1.39**
1.05**
17.46**
12.87
23.90
-1.18
9.83**
0.06**
0.86**
-1.88
-9.13
-13.68**
-18.58**
-15.14
-0.06
-33.87**
-0.03
-0.08**
58.45**

N

= 1233
(S.E.)

(2.32)
(14.57)
(4.43)
(7.99)
(0.18)
(0.04)
(3.07)
(10.41)
(26.10)
(3.27)
(2.98)
(0.01)
(0.45)
(14.70)
(4.76)
(3.18)
(8.99)
(17.94)
(11.89)
(9.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(12.88)

"*Significant at the .05 level (by one- or two-tail test as appropriate).
the nonlinear and nonadditive ones are more complicated functions
of parameters and variables. Differentiation shows that TRACK's effect is 315 + 1319 TRIAL + 1320 MOTION; that PRIOR's effect is 01js
/PRIOR; and so on. Estimates of these and other nonconstant effects appear in Table 3.
Tables 2 and 3 show that the "how" of disposition has a major
effect on the "how long" of disposition. Almost all of the case
events make a significant difference. The exceptions are late and
second preliminary hearings and mistrials. The point estimates are
not small-thirteen and twenty-four days-but the standard errors
are large, most likely because of low variance. 4 6 Both are infrequent
46 Take any linear equation. Denote the k' explanatory variable by x (k = 1,2 ..
K),
its coefficient by Bk and the OLS estimate of Bk by Pk- Working from (6-72) in J. JOHNsToN, ECONOMETRIC METHODS, 246 (3d ed. 1984) it is easy to show that the variance of
(p2i) is V(1Pi)=--/N*s,(1 - Rk), where oa is the disturbance variance, N is the sample size,
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events. 4 7 Other case events have significant though contingent effects. An early dismissal cuts processing time by thirty-one days
under the central docket, and by a slightly larger amount that varies
with the judge's caseload (providing the judge is a regular) under
the individual docket. The most decelerative case event is trial.
Under the central docket and sans case-track, a trial increases
processing time by sixty-nine days. As expected, the individual
docket reduces this effect, although the reduction falls short of significance. Low variance in DOCK*TRIAL (which is one only for trials, which are rare to begin with, and only under the individual
docket) is to blame. Contrary to expectation, the effect does not
change under the case-track. The case-track's plea cut-off date apparently made little difference. After trials, pretrial motions have
the most impact, adding fifty-four days to pre-case-track, but only
twenty days to post-case-track.
Each continuance increases processing time by seventeen days,
roughly consistent with Hausner and Seidel, 48 despite differences in
variables, models, and courts. Hausner and Seidel suggest that continuances are a stand-in for other actions by court participants. 4 9
But though we have measured and entered several of these actions
separately (in motions, psychiatric hiatus, and defendant absence),
continuances still have a major effect-slightly larger than in
Hausner and Seidel. Hence the court management literature's emphasis on the importance of a strong continuance policy 50 seems
well-placed.
Psychiatric hiatus and defendant absence also add to processing
time, but to different degrees. Every day of psychiatric evaluation or
treatment prolongs the case by 1.4 days. Committing a defendant
for ninety days of treatment costs 125 days of processing time; a
postponement of thirty days for evaluation costs forty-two days.
The most likely reason for this slippage is that cases in which the
defendant needs psychiatric attention are particularly difficult. Plea
s2 is the sample variance ofxk and R2 is the R 2 for the linear regression of x on the other

K

-

1 explanatory variables. This formula shows V(13 2 to be an increasing function of

collinearity, measured by Rk. But it also shows V(3 )'s dependence on other factorsmost notably on sk. Zero variance (s-- 0) has the same effect on V(k3l) as perfect col-

linearity (R2= 1), and low variance the same effect as high collinearity. The case of GLS,
which is simply OLS on appropriately transformed variables, is similar.
47 For binary variables, low frequency (of either category) means low variance. The
variance is maximal for a uniform (fifty-fifty) distribution and 0 when either category is
empty.
48 J. HAUSNER & M. SEIDEL, supra note 10.
49 Id.
50 See e.g., L. SIPES, A. CARLSON, T. TAN, A. AIKMAN & R. PAGE, MANAGING TO REDUCE
DELAY 29 (1980).
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negotiations take longer because the defense attorney has trouble
determining what his client wants or is willing to do or because the
defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge must grope toward an appropriate outcome. In contrast, defendant absence entails neither
incidental delay nor compensatory acceleration. The coefficient is
almost exactly 1.0.
Judging from the one variable representing the category, case
complexity also matters. On average, a case takes almost seven days
longer for every additional defendant. If the number of defendants
is large, the cost in time is substantial. A case with five defendants
can be expected to take twenty-seven days longer than a case with
only one defendant.
Case-level incentives have small-to-moderate effects. Surprisingly, cases with privately retained attorneys do not take distinguishably longer than those with court-appointed counsel. But a free
defendant, a stiff maximum sentence, and a lengthy prior record all
make for slower processing. Cases conclude ten days sooner when
the defendant is in jail. Every additional month of maximum sentence adds .06 days of processing, so that the difference between a
charge of possessing cocaine, with a maximum of twenty-four
months, and one of arson of a dwelling, with a maximum of 240
months, is fourteen days. The first prior conviction adds four days,
the next adds another two to three days and the third adds under
one-half day.
Again, it is hard to segregate structural incentives from structural facilitation. Many of our structural variables incorporate both.
At the least, however, it is clear that structural arrangements can
greatly slow or accelerate processing. The case-track cut processing
times dramatically for certain cases. Cases with motions were fortythree days shorter under the case-track. Even for the most streamlined cases-no trial, no motions-the case-track made a difference
of nine days. The decentralization of plea bargaining reduced
processing time by fourteen days. And the crash program decreased processing time by nineteen days. Motivational, administrative, and manpower contributions cannot be statistically separated,
but program veterans considered the increased hours and height-.
ened incentives most responsible for the program's effect.
Docket type, as we see it, is primarily an incentive variable, but
its effect is somewhat less clear. For early dismissals, the docket
change had essentially no effect-hardly surprising since it altered
only post-preliminary-exam calendaring. For pleas and dismissals,
the inldividual docket brought a modest reduction in processing
time. The heavier the judge's caseload, the greater the reduction.
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The individual docket reduced expected processing time by twelve
days for ajudge with 125 cases, but by only six days for ajudge with
only fifty cases. For trials, the effect increases to twenty-one days for
a judge with fifty cases and twenty-seven days for a judge with 125
cases. Thus, if taken at face value, the estimates suggest that the
docket change reduced processing times by two or three weeks. Unfortunately, however, these figures are statistically insignificant.
The estimated effect should be and is largest for trials but remains
insignificant even for trials, due to the large standard error for the
docket x trial interaction, due in turn to low variance. All we can say
with assurance is that the effect varies with the judge's caseload.
Most likely, however, docket type has a substantial effect. Except for large standard errors, the estimates look right, they are negative and larger in absolute value for trial cases and for judges with
larger caseloads. Experiments in other settings show that people
expend more effort on a given task when the responsibility is theirs
alone; individual accountability increases productivity. 5 1 Indeed,
many Recorder's Court regulars saw the docket change in precisely
this light. As one administrator put it, the central docket's supporters were motivated by the feeling that "the pressure is getting to me
and I don't want to work this hard." 5 2 Certainly, it was difficult to
get judges to accept cases under the central docket. One employee
of the state court administrator's office described the court schedul53
ing officer as having to go "around the court on his knees."
Judges who worked hard grew resentful, and worked less hard. In
the words of the same administrator, they became "unhappy about
having less productive judges foist cases on them, encroaching on
their leisure, trying to harness their productivity for the good of the
order against their will. So they ensured that there would be no
'54
excess productivity on their part."
One of the harder-working judges said much the same thing:
"some of the.., more ambitious judges finally adopted the attitude
of 'What's the use? It doesn't pay to carry more than your fair share
of the load because the others just don't care.' -55 The individual
docket made it more difficult for slackers and sluggards to escape
attention.
51 See Latan6, Williams & Harkins, Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and

Consequences of Social Loafing, 37J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 822-32 (1979);
Petty, Harkins, Williams & Latan6, The Effects of Group Size on Cognitive Effort and Evaluation, 3 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 572-82 (1977).
52 Anonymous interviews, in Detroit, Michigan (March 26-29, 1979).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Anonymous interviews, in Detoit, Michigan (March 12, 1979 & March 27, 1979).
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Secondarily, the docket change touched judges' incentives to
offer inducements to plead. Under the central docket, the judge supervising pre-trial negotiations would not have to try the case himself if negotiations failed. As one judge put it,
Under a central docket ajudge is not active [in plea bargaining] in that
he's not going to be stuck with the case. There's no reason why he
should be, you see. One of the most difficult things that a judge does
is not in the trial stage, but in the pretrial of cases. The risk that a
judge takes on his reputation-his political reputation-and everything else is in the pretrial stage. When I decide to take a reduced plea
and give 5a6 sentence bargain, that's when I lay myself on the line for
criticism.

That again leaves caseload. One of our more interesting findings is that under the central docket, the court caseload has no significant effect, whereas under the individual docket, the judge's
caseload has a negative effect. 5 7 When a judge's caseload increases
by fifty cases, he compensates by decreasing his average processing
time by four days. Under the individual docket, judges seem to have
become more "docket conscious," monitoring their dockets and attempting to keep them under control. Of course, the downside of
the relationship is that judges whose caseloads diminished tended to
relax, moving cases more slowly. One judge had a three-day trial
removed from his docket and promptly took a three-day vacation.
VII.

DISCUSSION

To sum up: most of the explanatory variables have their anticipated effects, and together they explain processing time quite well.
Only attorney type and court caseload plainly disappoint. Three
more effects are arguable: docket type, late or second preliminary
hearing, and mistrial, show substantively significant but statistically
insignificant effects.
The data also bear out most of the model's interactions. The
effect of an early dismissal is a bit greater under the individual
docket, where it is an increasing function of the judge's caseload,
provided that the judge is a regular. The effect of pretrial motions
is much slimmer under the case-track. Symmetrically, the effect of
the case-track is greater for cases with motions. For post-preliminary hearing cases, the effect of docket type is an increasing function
of the judge's caseload (under the individual docket). And the effect
of the docket type seems substantially greater (if "insignificantly")
56

Anonymous interview, in Detroit, Michigan (March 27, 1979).

57 Using aggregate data on U.S. District Courts, where dockets are individual, Gilles-

pie, supra note 24, also finds a negative effect.
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for trial cases as well. These interactions suggest that reformers
should consider how prospective reforms may affect cases differentially and that modelers should not automatically assume constant
effects.
The variables that clearly have an effect include representatives
of all six generic determinants. Precise comparisons between categories are impossible, but the caseload variables seem relatively ineffectual. The impact of average caseload is nil, and that of
individual caseload nontrivial but small. On the other side of the
scale, case events make a considerable difference. Defendants and
their attorneys, prosecutors, and judges make choices-to file motions, dismiss charges, negotiate pleas, etc.-with major consequences for processing time. Individual-level incentives have
generally smaller effects, but structural variables are powerful, and
interview evidence suggests that court-level incentives can lay claim
to much of their impact.
In our view, these results should finally put paid to the discouraging notion that the causes of processing time can be traced no
further back than to some nebulous "local legal culture." 5 8 Our
model's success shows that more precise explanation is possible. To
be fair, Church admits the fuzziness of local legal culture and calls
for clarification.5 9 He suggests-and we agree-that for local legal
culture to be more than a residual or catch-all variable, it must consist of clearly specified norms and expectations. 60 To date, the
norms and expectations in local legal culture remain largely unspecified, but the more fundamental question is how much norms and
expectations, however well specified, can matter. The fact that our
model explains as well as it does without so much as whispering
their names suggests that these norms and expectations are neither
so influential nor so exogenous as champions of local legal culture
explanations would have us believe. A priori, this is commonsense.
Norms and expectations may have some effect on processing times,
but the dominant flow is almost certainly in the other direction:
court participants form expectations by implicitly averaging the
processing times of similar cases. The reverse effect is small and too
proximate for interest. To the extent that norms and expectations
affect processing time, the interesting question is how they are deter58 See Church, supra note 1; Sherwood & Clarke, Toward an Understandingof Local Legal
Culture, 6JusT. SYs.J. at 200 (1981); T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON,J. LEE & T. TAN, supra note

3.
59 Church, supra note I.
60 Id.
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mined, and that leads back to specific structural and incentive-related variables.
The model's structural variables are of special interest, as they
bear on the effectiveness of Detroit's reforms and the potential for
similar efforts elsewhere. At least for certain cases, the reforms all
had substantial effects-the decentralization of plea-bargaining and
crash program unconditionally, the case-track for cases with motions, and (ifrather uncertainly) the individual docket for trial cases.
And athough the court caseload has no effect under the central
docket, the judge's caseload has a significant effect under the individual docket, with increasing caseloads resulting in shorter
processing times. Evidently, forcing judges to be answerable for
their own caseloads makes the system responsive to the length of
the queue.
These results have policy implications. The structural innovations in Detroit are typical of the ways courts have attempted to reduce processing times. Courts have commonly tried to achieve
tighter and earlier control over the progress of cases (the casetrack), to sharpen the incentive structure by increasing individual
accountability (the individual docket, decentralized plea-bargaining,
and the crash program), to improve coordination (the crash program), and to increase participants' familiarity with cases (decentralized plea bargaining). The success of these reforms in Detroit
should be encouraging to those making or proposing similar
changes elsewhere.
To be sure, the encouragement depends on the similarity. Superficially similar innovations may be sufficiently dissimilar to deprive them of impact. Case-tracks may have varying deadlines, for
varying events, with varying sanctions. Individual dockets may be
more or less individual. Judges in some individual docket systems
are rotated to other assignments and thereby relieved of their dockets periodically. Docket size may be given more or less publicity.
Similarly, decentralized plea-bargaining may be more or less decentralized. Both local discretion and the ratio of cases to prosecutorial
units may vary. And so on, and so on. Details will matter.
Other results also have policy implications. Constrained only
by manipulability, every effect suggests a way of reducing (or increasing) processing times. And not only structural variables are
manipulable, at least in the aggregate. If lengthier prior records
slow processing, police or prosecutorial policies that produce a
higher proportion of repeat offenders-not charging or diverting
more first-timers, for example-will increase average processing
time. Similarly, sentencing or plea-bargaining strictures producing
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a higher proportion of trials should greatly slow cases. Thus
although plea-bargaining is now under attack (in the public, if not in
the courts) and may be undesirable in other respects, bringing more
cases to trial may have a court-clogging effect. Another example is
motions. Any rule or behavior that discourages pretrial motions
should result in shorter processing times. Or, again, there is defendant absence. Perhaps by being more careful to remind defendants of court appearances or more efficient about corralling missing
defendants, a court can shorten the period of defendantless limbo
and thus the mean processing time.
These observations are non-normative. We are merely indicating some of the possibilities. We do not mean to recommend
changes that would reduce processing times or to reject changes
that would increase them. In either case, there may be tradeoffs that
outweigh the gain or loss in processing time. The point is that nonstructural as well as structural effects suggest ways in which court
policies and behaviors may intentionally or unintentionally affect
processing times.
Yet in closing we should also like to underscore "suggest."
Our results derive from only one court in only one period. Parameters and effects in other courts or in this court at other times may
look quite different. Time and further study will tell. Where differences emerge, the task will be to reduce the boundary conditions
(implicit interactions) responsible. This model and these results lie
nearer to the beginning than the end of investigation.

